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CAPITAL  FOR  THE  AGRICULTURE  OF  THE  FUTURE
James  S.  Plaxico  and Glenn J. Knowles
The  rapid  growth  in  value  of  farm  assets  tutions affecting the system and the apparent
and the explosive increase in farm debt over  options  available.  Major  implications  are
the past three decades  are well known facts  summarized and appropriate research and ed-
to agricultural  economists.  The  current  "fi-  ucation  emphasis  areas  are suggested.
nancial  stress"  has  become  a  survival  crisis
for  some  farmers,  and  the  commodity  pro-  IMPACT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  MARKETS
grams that were once reasonably effective are
now at best inefficient. The sequence of events  The  emergence  of  internationally  inte-
that led to our present agricultural  dilemma  grated financial  and commodity markets  and
may be debated,  but it  is clear that:  (1)  the  the growing importance of agricultural  trade
current  economic-financial  environment  of  have  and  will  continue  to  have  profound
agriculture  bears  little  resemblance  to  that  impacts on agriculture  and agricultural  cap-
of the  pre-1970's;  (2)  the direction  for the  ital  markets.  Furthermore,  the  competitive
future  is clouded  by  uncertainties;  and  (3)  forces  of  international  markets  will  exert
the  manner  by  which  the  current  financial  pressure  on  domestic  agricultural  product
dilemma in agriculture  is resolved will have  and  input prices.  Rural  communities,  insti-
a major impact on the scenario for the longer  tutions,  and farmers are  no longer sheltered
term future.  from the  competition  in national  and  inter-
A major  characteristic  of the current  eco-  national  financial  and  commodity  markets.
nomic-financial  environment  is  that  forces  Movement towards flexible exchange  rates
outside agriculture  play a  dominant  role  in  set the stage for a major restructuring of the
determining  the  current  and  future  state  of  international  financial  system.  Concurrently,
the agricultural  industry  and  the welfare  of  but  not  coincidentally,  commodity  markets
agricultural  producers  and  investors.  Some  were also undergoing significant change. Many
of those  major  forces  are  the  emergence  of  countries  were  relying  on  the  commodity
remarkably well integrated international  cap-  markets as a source of foreign exchange earn-
ital  and  commodity  markets,  drastically  re-  ings. While the term  "petrodollars"  conveys
structured  domestic  financial  markets,  an  this  notion of the  integration  of capital  and
expansive  domestic  fiscal  policy confronted  commodity markets,  a similar transition was
by a restrictive  monetary  policy,  a  less than  occurring in agricultural  markets.  Shocks to
buoyant  world  economy,  and  continued  balance  of payments positions attributable to
instability in world energy markets.  One con-  the commodities  markets  necessarily  quick-
sequence  is  that the  U.S.  economy  and  U.S.  ened  the  pace  of this  evolution  and  forced
agriculture  are no longer  effectively isolated  institutional  changes  in domestic markets.
from impacts of international markets.  Rather,  Under  a  regime  of fixed  exchange  rates,
the United States  is  a part  of what  may best  current account  (trade of goods and services
be  characterized  as  a  one  economy  world,  plus net earnings on foreign investments,  and
and U.S.  agriculture  is an integral  part of an  net transfers)  deficits were  matched by cap-
international  food system.  ital  account  (money  lent  or  invested)  sur-
In  this  paper,  some  of  the  major  forces  pluses or by central banks adjusting reserves.
shaping the  agricultural  environment  for  fi-  In the  past, changes  in balance  of payments
nancing  agriculture  over  the  remainder  of  positions were due primarily to shifts in trad-
the century are examined.  Emphasis is given  ing preferences. Currently, under floating ex-
to identifying  the  major variables  and  insti-  change  rates,  with  minor  and  infrequent
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103central  bank interventions,  current  account  deficits would help, but the present outlook
deficits  must  be  offset  by  capital  account  is that it will take some years for these deficits
surpluses.  The  floating  exchange  rate  is  the  to decline  to the  $100  billion range.  In the
equilibrating  mechanism  that  forces  a  bal-  long run, an increase  in private  savings will
ance  in total payments.  be  required  to  eliminate  trade  deficits.  A
The  current  account  deficit  in the United  surplus of capital funds abroad,  largely from
States in  1984 was  around  $120 billion,  and  petrodollars,  from  Japan  whose  maturing
is projected to be the same in  1985,  as com-  economy and high savings rates will increase
pared to a surplus of $6 billion in 1981.  The  their net international  investment,  and from
United  States  will  therefore  be  importing  a  less  demand  by  developing  countries  who
large  amount of capital from abroad.  By  his-  must  resolve  their  current  debt  repayment
torical  standards,  the  dollar  is  priced  high  problems first, may help keep the U.S. capital
relative  to trade weighted  averages  of other  account  in balance.
currencies.  The  basis  for  this  situation  is  One  disturbing  facet  of the  high value  of
largely  a  change  in  investment  preferences  the dollar is the resurgence of a protectionist
(Feldstein)  and relative  savings  rates, thus  a  climate  in  the  United  States.  Protectionism
new importance has been placed on the cap-  could be detrimental to U.S. agriculture since
ital account in the balance  of payments.  The  other countries  will retaliate against our ex-
effect  is  that  the  dollar  is  strong,  but  not  ports and spur foreign  countries  on  to self-
overvalued.  The  reasons  for  the  increased  sufficiency  in food  production,  thus  further
attractiveness  of  U.S.  investments  has  been  diminishing U.S.  agricultural  exports.  In ad-
lower perceived  risk,  lower expected  infla-  dition, it could  slow the flow of capital  into
tion, and large  budget  deficits  in the United  this country,  thereby exerting  upward pres-
States.  sure  on interest  rates.
What  are  the implications  of this  new in-
ternational  order  for  U.S.  agriculture?  First,  DOMESTIC  FINANCIAL  MARKETS
the potential supply of capital to agriculture  The  late  1970's  and  early  1980's  have
is greater  than it would have been  if capital  brought  unparalleled  changes  in  U.S.  finan-
markets  were  not  internationalized.  The  cial  markets.  Financial  institutions,  instru-
budget deficits,  instead of only crowding out  ments,  and  practices  comprise  financial
domestic  capital,  also  influence  the  larger  markets  at local,  national,  and international
pool  of international  capital.  This  includes  levels.  The  function  of financial  markets  is
U.S.  investments  abroad.  U.S.  banks  claims  to  provide  for  a  system  to  channel  savings
abroad were  $25 billion in 1983,  down from  into  investments, bear risks,  and provide for
$111  billion  in  1982.  Without the  infusion  efficient  transactions  and payments  (Barry)
of foreign  capital,  interest  rates  would  be  In the public interest,  financial  markets have
higher  and  financial  stress  in  agriculture  long been  subjected  to  close  scrutiny  by  a
would be  more  severe  than  now.  variety  of  regulatory  agencies.  Regulations
The  increased  importance  of the  capital  and legislation affecting financial markets have
account in the balance of payments is a two-  traditionally restricted geographic expansion
edged  sword. The  demand  for capital in the  of financial  institutions,  limited the scope of
United  States  has forced  a high value  of the  services  provided  by  the  different  institu-
dollar  by historical  standards,  but not over-  tions,  controlled  interest  rates  paid  on  the
valued  vis-a-vis other  currencies.  Thus,  U.S.  various  classes  of deposits,  established  cap-
agricultural  exports  are  less  competitive  in  ital and liquidity requirements,  and set loan
international markets.  While the agricultural  limits.
trade balance  in  fiscal  1984 was  up slightly  From an uncontrolled industry in the early
from  the  1983  level,  it  was  far  below  the  history of the  country,  restrictions  were  im-
level  in 1981,  and the U.S.  share  of agricul-  posed gradually on financial markets. During
tural trade  was  down.  the  crisis  depression  years,  itl  order to  sta-
An  increase  in net national  savings  in  the  bilize financial  markets,  restore  public  con-
United States will be necessary to reduce  the  fidence, and improve the survival probabilities
exchange  rate  of the  dollar  and  simultane-  of financial institutions, financial markets were
ously  balance  the  capital  and  current  ac-  subjected to an array of regulations  and  sev-
counts.  Increasing  the  supply  of capital  to  eral  new  financial  institutions  were  estab-
the private sector by decreasing federal budget  lished.  Social,  economic,  and technological
104developments  during  the  1970's  created  depository  institutions of a given  class were
pressures  to  alter  and  relax  the  regulatory  required  to  pay identical  rates  on deposits,
climate. After numerous reviews and analyses  small  savers  deposited  their  funds  in  local
of likely  implications,  Congress  passed  the  institutions  which in turn created  a  pool  of
Depository Institution Deregulation and Mon-  loanable funds available to local farmers and
etary Control Act  (DIDMCA)  of 1980 and the  other business people.  In general, it appears
Depository  Institute Act  (DIA)  of 1982.  that to  date  local  financial  institutions  have
In general,  DIDMCA  and  DIA provide  for  effectively  competed with money center  in-
a  phasing  out  of  interest  rate  ceilings  on  stitutions  so that  there  has  been  no massive
deposits,  authorize  interest  bearing  transac-  movement  of rural  area  deposits  to  metro-
tion  accounts,  and  give  federally  chartered  politan areas.  However,  loan demand during
thrift  institutions  authority  to  make  con-  the  post  deregulation  period  has  not  been
sumer,  commercial, and agricultural loans as  unusually strong.
well as to provide  transaction accounts.  The  Deregulation  has  raised  interest  rates  to
overall effect of the legislation and regulatory  borrowers  due  to the  disappearance  of cost
directives  of the  early  1980's  has  been  de-  free deposits and increased rate volatility re-
scribed as "providing for a level playing field"  flecting  national  and  international  financial
for competing financial  institutions.  Clearly,  market  conditions.  At  the  same  time,  dere-
the array of financial  services  that the differ-  gulation and  access  to national  and  interna-
ent institutions offer has been broadened, the  tional  markets  permit  capital  to  flow  to
various  institutions  are  less specialized,  and  geographic  areas  offering the most favorable
competition  among  institutions  has  been  terms. Thus, funds available to banks for local
greatly enhanced.  lending are no longer limited to locally gen-
The Congress,  to date,  has elected to defer  erated  savings  and deposits.  As  financial  in-
to the  various  states with respect  to regula-  stitutions consolidate and restructure,  larger
tions  concerning  geographic  expansion  of  effective  lending limits will permit banks to
banking  activities.  Several  states  have  re-  more  adequately  serve  large  scale  commer-
cently enacted  legislation permitting limited  cial agriculture.  An often voiced  concern  is
branch banking and multi-bank holding com-  that deregulation and restructuring will cause
panies.  Numerous  banks  have  loan  produc-  capital to flow to the financial  centers so that
tion  offices  in  various  states  and  the  local interests will be less well served.  How-
Comptroller of the Currency in October 1984  ever,  there  is  a  paucity  of hard evidence  in
approved  several  consumer  or  "non-bank"  support of this view.
banks  with branches  in several  states.  How-
ever,  full service  (deposits  and  commercial  THE  COOPERATIVE  FARM  CREDIT
loans)  interstate  commercial  banks  are  not  SYSTEM
now authorized, although the concensus pre-
diction is that interstate banking is imminent.  The  Farm  Credit  System  (FCS)  held  44
The  implications of the decontrol of finan-  percent of the farm real estate  debt,  20 per-
cial  markets  and  the  restructuring  of  insti-  cent of the non-real  estate debt,  and  33  per-
tutions  are  far  reaching.  Small  savers  have  cent  of total farm  debt on January  1,  1985.
access  to  market  rates  of  interest  that  pre-  Thus, the  FCS is currently a major, if not the
viously  were  available  only to  large  savers  dominant,  source  of  debt  capital  for  agri-
through  unregulated  jumbo  C.D.'s,  and the  culture.  The FCS long ago developed a struc-
various  interest bearing transaction  accounts  ture that facilitates utilization of national and
provide  a  form  of cash management  to con-  international capital markets to provide loan-
sumers  and  small  business  firms.  With  un-  able  funds  to  agriculture,  along  with  a  na-
regulated  interest  rates,  savers  can  "shop"  tionwide  distribution  system.  In  many
for the best combination of interest rates and  respects,  the architects of the  FCS created an
other service. As a consequence, deposits may  institution  with many  of the  attributes  and
be  less  stable within  individual  institutions  advantages  that commercial  bankers are cur-
and  within  the  various  geographic  regions,  rently seeking through restructuring. The FCS
and the overall  cost of money to lenders  has  has  a very  strong capital  base,  as  compared
been  increased,  to  other  lenders,  but  has  limited  loan  di-
In  effect,  removal  of interest rate  ceilings  versification  options.
has  transformed  local  financial  markets  to  In  anticipation  of  a  decade  of  further
national  and international  markets.  When all  change,  the  FCS initiated an extensive  study
105and  planning  process,  designated  Project  are well developed.  The same is not the case
1995,  with  the  objective  of designing  and  for agricultural equity capital.  Currently,  ag-
implementing  thoughtful  change.  The  var-  ricultural  equity  markets  are  highly  local-
ious analyses and reports flowing from Project  ized,  informal,  and probably inefficient.  The
1995 examine  the likely future environment  same is the case for the long term asset leasing
for the FCS, identify major issues, and suggest  markets.  Institutional  barriers,  such  as  the
alternative  strategies.  Project  1995  will  ap-  prohibition  of alien and/or  corporate  own-
parently be  a continuing process  of strategic  ership of farm land, no doubt account in part
planning at all levels in the System. In reading  for the lack of a formal organized  market  in
the  various  Project  1995  summary  docu-  agricultural  asset  equities.  However,  other
ments,  one can  easily  conclude  that  greater  factors such as the extra-market value placed
market penetration may be a major objective  on  land,  the  desire  to  "preserve  the  family
of the System.  farm,"  and similar agricultural fundamental-
In  the  Project  1995  report  relating  to  fi-  ist views  are  no doubt contributing  factors.
nancial  markets,  the  agency  status  issue  is  As  suggested earlier, decontrol  of financial
addressed  (Farm  Credit  System,  1984a,  p.  markets  has  increased  financial  risks  in ag-
30).  Options are  identified  in the event  loss  riculture and in other industries,  and we are
of agency status  becomes a  reality.  The  op-  aware  of no evidence  that  business  risks  in
tions are  defined  in terms  of clientele  to be  agriculture  have been moderated. This would
served  and  funding  source  options.  The  re-  suggest a need for a market for spreading the
moval of agency status for the  FCS has been  agricultural  equity  risk  over  a  broad  base.
evaluated  by Lins  and Barry.  The  agency  ad-  Clearly, the investment banking industry and
vantages over other lenders in acquiring loan-  other financial  service  entities  have in place
able  funds  enumerated  by  Lins  and  Barry  the instruments to provide equity investment
include  the  implicit government  backing of  opportunities  in agriculture on an organized
securities, certain regulatory exemptions and  market  base  that  would  provide  liquidity.
preferences, and limited tax exemptions. They  However,  such markets will develop  only  if
cite  arguments  for  and  against  removal  of  agricultural  equity  instruments  provide  re-
agency  status.  turns  comparable  to other  investments  with
An  affirmative  act  of  Congress  would  be  similar risk and  liquidity characteristics.  Al-
required  to  remove  the  FCS  agency  status.  though  the future  course  of events with  re-
Given the current  financial  stress  in agricul-  spect to ownership structure is far from clear,
ture,  loss  of agency  status  or  imposition  of  it seems inevitable that there will be a trend
a "user fee" for the FCS appear to be remote  toward separation of the ownership  and  op-
possibilities.  If the current situation persists,  erating functions.
an  explicit guarantee  would  appear  to be  a
more likely possibility. Such a guarantee could  CAPITAL  REQUIREMENTS  AND
assure  an  orderly  flow  of funds to  qualified  FINANCIAL  STRUCTURE
borrowers,  despite  continuing  stress on  the
System  and the  industry.  Capital requirements  in agriculture, in real
FCS borrowers  are  in the unique position  terms,  are  determined  by the rate  of capital
of being equity owners of their creditor. Dur-  formation  in  the  industry.  When  decision-
ing  a  period  of  financial  stress,  this  dual  makers  elect  to invest  in  technology to  en-
relationship  has  the  potential  to  create  a  hance  output,  to  improve  efficiency,  or  to
problem  for  the  System.  If  borrowers  are  augment  industry  financial  capital,  capital
aware of loan loss sharing obligations,  and if  formation  can occur at a rapid rate. Much  of
the association  capital base is eroding,  there  the  capital  in  agriculture  is  specialized  to
may be  a  tendency  for the  better credits  to  the  extent  that  it  is  difficult  to  transfer  to
migrate to other lenders, thereby placing fur-  other industries. However,  real negative  cap-
ther  stress on the  institution.  Depending  on  ital formation  (disinvestment)  may occur  as
the  specifics  of the loan loss agreement,  the  a consequence  of failure to maintain  capital
district and the System could also be affected.  stocks  as  assets  depreciate  or  by  causality
losses.
EQUITY  CAPITAL  Capital requirements  in agriculture  can be
met  by cash  flow  (retained  earnings)  from
The preceding  discussion  suggests  that  fi-  the industry,  by a net infusion of equity cap-
nancial markets  for agricultural  debt capital  ital from non-agricultural  sources, or by debt
106capital. The financial structure of the industry  SUBSIDIZED  CREDIT
refers to the  mix  of equity and  debt capital
in the industry  at a  point in time.  It is well
known that agriculture  has traditionally been  Subsidized  credit refers to loans made  un-
largely  equity financed.  der terms more favorabl  tthan those available
It  should  be  clear,  however,  that  capital  from private sources, and to loans that would
formation  at  either the  micro  or the  macro  nt  be approved by private lenders. In 1983,
levels is not necessarily related to the demand  federal  or  federally  assisted  lending  ac-
for  debt  finance.  As  entities  enter  and  exit  counted  for  $86  billion,  or  17  percent  of
the  industry,  the  rate  of  capital  formation  funds  advanced  in  U.S.  credit  markets
may be  zero  although  the  demand  for debt  (Lieblich).  The subsidies  associated with  di-
finance and the financial structure may change  rect  loans made  by the Federal  Government
at both the firm and industry levels.  Consider  in  1983 have been estimated at  $8.3 billion,
two producing units,  "A"  and "B",  with the  with  70  percent  of  the  subsidy  value  pro-
financial  characteristics  described below.  vided  through  loan  programs  of  USDA.
Farmers  Home Administration  (FmHA)  loans
for both real estate  and non-real  estate have
"A"  "B"  "C"  been increasing  in absolute amounts and rel-
Assets  $200,000  $100,000  $300,000  ative to other lenders. The shift is particularly
Debt  20,000  5,000  120,000  significant in the case of non-real estate loans
D/A  .1  .05  .4  where the FmHA share  has increased from 4
percent in 1977 to 15 percent in 1982,  1983,
and  1984.  Thus,  subsidized  credit  is  a  sig-
If "B"  exits agriculture  and the  assets  are  nificant  agricultural  finance  policy issue.
acquired  by  "A"  to  create  "C",  then  debt  The Joint Economic Committee has defined
required to  finance  the  combined  assets  in-  a subsidy as  "any one-way government con-
creases  from  $25,000  to  $120,000  or a  net  trolled income  transfer to private sector
increase  of $95,000.  This  of course  occurs  decisionmaking units..." (Lieblich).  Credit
because in exiting agriculture  "B"  has trans-  subsidies  may be designed to alter the struc-
ferred  $95,000 of equity from agriculture to  ture  of  resource  control,  re-distribute  in-
another  sector.  A  major  point  is  that  farm  come,  stabilize  prices,  or  alter  production
consolidations accomplished by farmers have  levels. In a very broad sense,  FCS loans could
a major impact  on the demand for debt and/  be considered subsidized loans since agency
or  equity  capital  even  though  the  rate  of  status  may  reduce  the  cost  of  funds  to
capital  formation  is  zero.  The  same  results  FCS.  Likewise,  Commodity  Credit  Corpora-
can occur  if operating farmers  use debt cap-  tion  (CCC)  commodity  and  facility  loans
ital to meet cash operating cost requirements.  could  be  subsidized  loans  due  to  the  non-
During the late  1960's, Melichar and Doll  recourse  feature  in  the  case  of commodity
estimated  the  capital  withdrawn  from  the  loans  and  the  possibility  of terms  more  fa-
farming  sector  by  sellers,  primarily  retiring  vorable  than private sector loans  in the case
farmers and non-farm heirs. The Melichar and  of facility  loans.  However,  for  purposes  of
Doll estimates suggest that over the  1965-69  this  discussion,  CCC  loans  will  be  ignored
period real estate  transfers  accounted  for al-  since they are  primarily  associated  with the
most 40 percent of total capital flow. It should  price  support  programs  and  FCS  loans  are
be pointed out that capital withdrawals from  excluded  since  they  involve  no  direct  gov-
the industry by departing farmers arising from  ernment funds  and are generally  considered
the sale  of non-real  assets should be treated  to  be  "bankable"  loans.  The  discussion  is
in the same  manner as  real  estate.  Likewise,  further  limited  to FmHA  farmer  loans.
equity  investments  in  agriculture  by  non-  FmHA direct and guaranteed  loans are the
farmers  should be  considered.  primary sources  of subsidized  loans  in agri-
It is  clear that capital  formation  less  debt  culture,  although  the Small Business Admin-
flow  is not an  adequate  estimate  of the  use  istration  (SBA)  is involved  to a very  limited
of cash flow requirements to finance a chang-  extent.  The loans of primary interest are the
ing  agricultural  structure.  The  problem  is  FmHA ownership and operating loans, as well
particularly  acute  during  periods  of  rapid  as  their  disaster  and  economic  emergency
farm  consolidation  or  during  periods  of  loans.  Currently,  the FmHA  ownership  loans
change  in the  ownership  structure.  are limited to $300,000 in the case of insured
107(direct)  and  $400,000  in the  case  of guar-  natural  and  economic  risks  inherent  in  ag-
anteed  loans  made  by  a  third  party.  Farm  riculture,  again  the issue  is how  the public
operating loans are limited to  $200,000 and  can  most  efficiently  assume  its  share  of the
$400,000  for  insured  or  guaranteed  loans,  risk.  The alternatives  available appear to en-
respectively.  The disaster  (natural)  and eco-  tail  some  version  of the  current  loan  pro-
nomic  emergency  loans  are  limited  to  grams  or  an  insurance  type  program.  One
$500,000 and $400,000 respectively.  FmHA  attraction  of  an  insurance  program  is  that
direct loans  carry interest rates based on the  more  debt does  not  appear,  in many  cases,
government  cost  of  funds  and  guaranteed  to  make  a  positive  contribution  to  the  af-
loans  are  made  at  rates  charged  other  bor-  fected individuals.
rowers in the private sector. Economic emer-
gency  loan authority expired September  30,
1984.  INFLATION,  DEFLATION,  AND 1984.  STRUCTURE
Not surprisingly,  FmHA has been criticized  STRUCTURE
for  making  loans  that are  too  large  and  too  Several analyses suggest that farmland prices
small, and for failure to foreclose soon enough  are  determined  by anticipated  returns  from
and  for  foreclosing  too  soon.  Much  of the  farming  (e.g.  Melichar,  1983).  It  has  also
criticism  of FmHA  has  been  directed  to the  been  argued  that  farmland  prices  are  deter-
disaster and emergency loan programs. These  mined mainly within the farm sector (Phipps).
programs  have  fewer  restrictions  than  the  These  results  would  seem  to  suggest  that
ownership  and  operating  loans,  thus  larger,  holding  land  as  an  inflation  hedge  or  as  a
more  affluent  farmers  are  eligible  for  the  "collectible"  would  have  little,  if any,  im-
loans.  pact on land prices.  Data, methodology,  and
It  is  apparently  the  wish  of citizens  and  interpretation limitations should suggest cau-
the Congress that debt capital be made avail-  tion in accepting these conclusions  (Plaxico
able  to limited resource,  primarily younger,  and  Kletke;  Plaxico,  1979).  However,  re-
individuals who desire to become established  gardless  of the  structure  determining  land
in  agricultural  production  and  who  have  a  prices,  the impact of capital gains and losses
reasonable  chance  of  succeeding.  Clearly,  on  the size  structure  in agriculture  is  a  rel-
such loans are high risk ventures.  Thus,  it is  evant  issue.
not prudent for the private sector,  including  When  land  prices  were  rising  during  the
FCS, to extend such loans. The relevant issue  1970's,  land investments were often thought
is  how  can  society  most  efficiently  channel  of  as  being  analogous  to  investments  in  a
debt capital  to limited  resource  farmers.  growth stock.  For an established  landowner,
Insured  (direct)  FmHA  ownership  and op-  it was  easy to expand  by leveraging  (mone-
erating  loans  are  subsidized  by  lower  than  tizing)  the  increased equity in existing  land
private  sector  interest  rates,  and  loans  are  holdings to acquire equity in additional  land.
made  that would not be made in the private  Some  economists  suggested,  and  numerous
sector,  thus  involving  a  significant  implicit  expansionary landowners practiced,  borrow-
risk  premium.  Also,  continuing  loan  super-  ing against an increasing equity to meet mort-
vision is provided without cost to the client.  gage  payment and  other  cash  requirements.
In  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  growing  This was  possible  because  many  lenders,  in
interest in and use of guaranteed loans. These  spite  of an  otherwise  declared  policy, were
loans are  administered  by private  sector en-  quite  willing  to  lend on  the  basis  of  assets
tities,  are 90 percent  FmHA guaranteed,  and  with little  regard  for cash  flow from  opera-
carry market interest rates. They are attractive  tions. Thus, without  doubt,  available  financ-
to private  sector  lenders  because  the  guar-  ing  accompanied  by low and even  negative
anteed  portion  of the  loans  are  marketable  real  interest  rates  stimulated  farm  consoli-
in upstream  financial  markets  and  exposure  dations and the consequent rapid increase  in
is limited  by the guarantee.  Yet,  there  is  an  debt of expanding  farmers.
incentive  for  the  lender  to be  judicious  in  More recently,  land asset values have shrunk
extending  loans  since  there  is  a  significant  and the real rate of interest is relatively high.
exposure  for the  lender.  Thus,  the  opportunity  to borrow  against  an
Disaster and emergency  loan programs  are  increasing land equity is no longer available
difficult  to  administer.  If,  as  appears  to  be  and lending institutions appear to have shifted
the  case,  the  public  and  the  Congress  are  from asset based to cash flow based lending.
willing  for  the  public  to  share  the  major  As  a  consequence,  some  landowners  have
108found  it  necessary  to forfeit all  or  a  part of  tend to tilt the structure toward  larger units.
their holdings  due to their inability  to meet  If,  however,  established  producers  who  did
payment requirements.  One question is, how  not expand  rapidly  during  the  1970's  view
will  these  voluntary  and/or  mandatory  for-  land,  at  or  near  current  prices,  as  a  good
feitures  impact on the  size  structure?  investment,  the  redistribution  may  be  size
The  initial impact  of the current  crisis ap-  neutral.
pears  to be that  lenders  are becoming  large
landowners.  The  ultimate  impact  on  struc-
ture  will  likely  depend  on the  period  over  MANAGEMENT  OF  FINANCIAL
which the current situation persists, the level  INS
to which asset values decline, lender strategy
regarding  disposition  of farmland  acquired,  Deregulation,  volatility,  and intense  com-
and who ultimately purchases the land. Lend-  petition have  had a profound impact  on the
ers  are  currently  confronted  with  a  major  management options of financial institutions.
policy decision  regarding  whether  or when  Prior  to  deregulation,  local  capital  market
to  foreclose  on  non-performing  loans,  and  deposits (loanable funds) tended to be highly
whether to hold foreclosed  properties in in-  stable. Thus, managers attempted to maintain
ventory  or  to  finance  a  sale  to  another  op-  a  level  of loans  in relation  to deposits  that
erator.  Foreclosure  and  immediate  sale  would optimize the overall portfolio in terms
inevitably means a realized loss to the lending  of institutional objectives. With deregulation,
institution and possible further depression of  there  is  no  easy  relationship  between  de-
collateral values. Failure to foreclose exposes  posits and loans since by adjusting rates,  the
the lender to the possibility of greater losses.  deposit base of individual institutions can be
Holding  foreclosed  property  exposes  the  adjusted,  thus  expanding  available  options.
lender  to  the  possibility  of  negative  cash  In short,  it is  now  possible,  and mandatory,
flows and  further capital  losses.  Thus,  there  that  attention be directed to managing  both
is no  easy choice.  the  asset and  the liability sides  of the  insti-
Debt  is  not uniformly distributed  in  agri-  tution's  portfolio.
culture.  USDA  has estimated that on January  With stable interest rates, it was often con-
1,  1984,  18  percent  of farm  operators  had  sidered prudent  for a financial  institution  to
debt/asset ratios of 40 percent or higher.  Yet,  acquire long term assets  (loans)  on the basis
these  operators  held 56  percent of the farm  of short  term liabilities  (deposits).  It is that
debt  and  owned  14  percent  of farm  assets.  practice  that has created  difficulties  in many
Of farms with sales of $500,000 and above,  savings and loan institutions.  Thus, changing
33  percent  of the  operators  had  debt/asset  and volatile interest rates expose the financial
ratios  of 40  percent or above,  but these  op-  institutions to extreme  risks,  unless  the  risk
erators  owed  60  percent  of the debt  of the  is passed to the borrower or risks are managed
group  and  owned  16  percent  of the  groups  by properly managing  both assets and liabil-
assets.  Thus,  these  and  other  data  sources  ities.
show that a disproportionate share of the debt  The  changing  role  of the  managers  of fi-
is owed  by a relatively small percent  of op-  nancial institutions  is  a relevant  issue  in  ag-
erators  that  are  younger  than  average  and  ricultural  credit  from  at  least  three
operate  larger  units.  It  is important  to rec-  perspectives.  First,  in order to assess the vi-
ognize  that a  further decline  in asset values  ability  of  an  institution  as  an  agricultural
will cause a further deterioration in ratios  of  lender,  one  must appraise  how  agricultural
highly leveraged  individuals while in the ag-  loans fit in the institutions overall  portfolio.
gregate  the effect  may be  minimal.  Second,  if survival  of rural  financial  institu-
Private estimates suggest that if the current  tions  as agricultural lenders  is thought to be
farm income  situation persists  for two more  desirable,  there  is  a  major  research  and ed-
years,  20-40  percent  of  commercial  farms  ucation  opportunity  in  aiding  institution
will  fail.  If this  in fact  occurs,  a  variety  of  managers  to  adjust  to  the  role  required  in
scenarios  are possible.  If asset values  decline  the  contemporary environment.  Third, there
to  a  point  that  production  becomes  profit-  is  a  need  for  assessing  ways  that  financial
able,  non-farm  based equity,  such  as  corpo-  institutions might best manage the increasing
rate  entities  and  pension  funds,  may  view  risks  in  financial  markets  in  some  manner
agricultural  land as  an  attractive  investment  other than by simply shifting the risk to bor-
for  earnings  and  capital  gains.  This  would  rowers  through variable  interest rate  loans.
109FARM  FINANCIAL  MANAGEMENT  tural lending  institutions,  particularly  small
is  abun l  cr  tt  od h  d  rural unit banks with undiversified portfolios.
It is abundantly  clear that good husbandry i  not a  sufficientgco  rs  If the  current  financial  situation  in  agri- is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  success  in culture is considered to be a temporary phe- agricultural production given the current and  nomenon,  and it  is  considered  desirable  to
probable future environment.  Changes  in the macro fi  l  environment  have  e  improve  the survival probabilities  of farmers macro  financial  environment  have  created and/or  lending  institutions,  a  publicly sup- major challenges for managers, their advisors,  portedprogra  mightbeconidered  On
and for  academic  financial  experts.  For  ex- f  a  . F  possibility would  be  a  loan  guarantee  pro- ample, the  current  period is the first period  g  fo  te  poble  fam  loans  he  gram  for  the  problem  farm  loans  held  by of declining asset values experienced by the  om  rcial  lending  institutions  For  exam-
vast  majority  of involved  individuals.  Thus, pie, given the foregoing  estimates,  a 90 per-
a  major  issue  relates  to  how  financial  man-  cent  loan  guarantee  program  would  appear
agement  and  decisionmaking  expertise  can  to involve  a  curren exposure  of abou  $55
best  be provided  to production  agriculture  b  (  billion  ($61  x  .9).  The  program  could  in-
managers.  Some  of  the  alternatives  are  to  volve market  interest rates plus an insurance
expand  extension  education  efforts  directly  f  t  fund to be paid to the administering  agency
to producers,  to provide extension education  order to capture the benefits of gegrphi in order to capture the benefits of geographic for financial institution personnel who would  diversificatio  The guarantee coud be lifted diversification.  The guarantee  could be lifted in turn work  with producer-customers,  and  o  or  transferred to a  private  insurer when the
to encourage  development of third party con-  crisis  is alleviated
suiting expertise that would be available  on
Obviously,  the program outlined is similar a fee  basis  to producers.a fe  bais  at  o uers.e  . to recent FmHA programs,  but it is not clear It is likely that the financial  planning sup- that  FmHA  should  administer  the  program port  system  that  eventually  evolves will  be  outlined  here are  e outlined. There are persuasive  arguments  for some  combination  of the  options  cited.  In establishing  a  small  new "independent  and any event,  it is apparent  that a quantum  ex-  a  t  a '^~~~~  . ,^  ..  ^.temporary" agency  to avoid  the  conflict  of pansion  of financial  expertise  in the  public  objective  thawould be involved in a FmHA
sector,  primarily  in  the  Land-Grant  System,  administered program and to clearly separate
is indicated.  Subject matter expertise will be  i  from  subsidized  credit  programs.  If the
required  in financial  analysis,  financial  mar-  pogrm were limited to pro  ers that have
kets,  risk  management,  financial  institution  chace  o  succei  ie  a  legitimate  chance  of succeeding,  given an management,  and  related areas. manageme, ad  r  d  mprovement  in  the  agricultural  economy,
the  ultimate  cost  could  be  modest  and the
program  might be structure neutral.
CRISIS  MANAGEMENT  POLICY
USDA reports indicate that the 17.7 percent  CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS
of farm operators who had debt-to-asset ratios
of 40 percent or more owed 56.2  percent of  There  have been  major changes  in the ag-
the farm debt January  1, 1984,  or about  $86  ricultural finance  environment,  in the struc-
billion  of the  $153  billion  owed to  institu-  ture  of  financial  markets,  and  in  the
tions  excluding  CCC.  Presumably  most,  if  agricultural  production  sector.  Further
not all, of the $24 billion held by FmHA plus  changes  are  in  store.  In  general,  the  envi-
some  $1  billion of FmHA  guarantees  fall  in  ronmental  changes  have resulted  in  a  more
the  40  percent  or  higher  debt/asset  ratio  direct  linkage  of local,  national,  and  inter-
category,  leaving  perhaps  $61  billion  unin-  national capital and commodity markets. The
sured  in the portfolios  of other institutions,  internationalization  of  agriculture  has  re-
The  economic  survival  of many  of the  op-  suited  in increasing volatility  and  has made
erators with such high debt ratios, and who  it much  more  difficult to predict the  course
have  limited  non-farm  cash  flow,  is  clearly  of economic variables.  Financial markets and
in jeopardy given the current economic state  the  agricultural  sector  are  restructuring  to
of agriculture.  Further, it is difficult for lend-  better cope with the emerging environment.
ers to prosper when their customers are hav-  It seems clear that debt capital will be avail-
ing  difficulties.  Thus,  a  continuation  of the  able to agricultural producers, deemed credit
current situation may lead to significant farm  worthy,  on a  competitive  basis  at a  cost re-
business  failures  and  to  failures  of agricul-  flecting opportunity costs in other industries
110as well  as volatility and other risk elements.  Over the longer run,  a broad based program
The  future  is less  clear  with respect  to  the  of finance  research  and  teaching should  be
development  of agricultural  equity  markets  a priority concern.  Apparently,  the bio-tech-
and the provision  of financial  expertise  and  nology (land based "star war"  equivalent)  is
services to  agricultural  managers.  receiving strong emphasis. Although tangible
Environmental and structural change place  applied results are unlikely in this decade or
tremendous  stress  on  the  financial  skills  of  even this century,  bio-technology  is likely to
agricultural production  managers.  The short  generate major shifts in relative resource and
run critical  problem for leveraged  managers  product  prices,  thus  putting  even  greater
is financial survival  in the face  of disinflation  stress on the financial management function.
involving  shrinking  asset  values,  depressed  The  manner  in which  financial  expertise
commodity prices, and the apparent necessity  is made  available  in agriculture  is uncertain
of shrinking  aggregate  production  capacity.  and yet to be determined.  It may be  via the
How  this  crisis  period  is  managed  in  the  conventional  extension  structure.  An  alter-
aggregate will,  to a  large  extent,  dictate  fu-  native  may  be  via  independent  consulting
ture options.  firms  or  by  employees  of  financial  institu-
Finance  is  one  of the  areas  that  has  been  tions.  Emergence  of more  agricultural  pro-
endured  with  benevolent  neglect  in  many  duction firms organized by financially oriented
land-grant  institutions.  Thus,  it  is not  clear  (vs.  husbandry)  individuals  and groups may
that  the  expertise  exists  to  provide  the  re-  also  be  seen.  Still  another  possibility  may
search  and  education  base  for  dealing with  be  an  equity  market-financial  management
the  current  financial  stress  in  agriculture.  package.
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